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IN MEDIAS RES 
LARRY YACKLE∗ 
It’s common in academic circles to distinguish between positive arguments 
(which describe things as they are) and normative arguments (which prescribe 
the way things ought to be).  The distinction dissolves as soon as accounts of 
how the world works spill over into justifications for the status quo.  That 
happens a lot, especially in discussions of theory.  It happens again in David 
Strauss’ wonderful monograph.1  Strauss offers a succinct exposition of the 
constitutional system we actually observe, coupled with a powerful 
explanation of how and why the scheme functions as it does and genuine 
reassurance that, on the whole, we can and should be satisfied. 
I am convinced Strauss has all this about right.  In the main, I come to praise 
him.  I will make this clear in Part I.  We have a living Constitution.  We make 
it up as we go along, according to a frame of reference that both enables and 
curbs our appetite for change and, into the bargain, holds us together as a 
people.  I do have reservations about some aspects of his case, though, and I 
will sketch them in Part II.  I also wonder what implications Strauss’ theory 
may have for a purely normative question he doesn’t address – namely, how an 
original document should be drafted for the purpose of fostering a living 
Constitution over time.  I offer some thoughts along those lines in Part III. 
I 
Legal theorists can’t muddle along like real people, operating within the 
constitutional system, never pausing to reflect on the whole of which they and 
their actions are a part.  Theorists are supposed to explain stuff.  They are 
supposed to connect the dots, or at least to try.  Professor Strauss carries this 
burden as well as anyone writing in the field today.  He imposes no deep 
philosophical concepts on the Constitution; he reads no contested political 
values into it.  Instead, he offers a down-to-earth, objective, and above all wise 
appraisal of what we are doing and where we may be going.  His analysis 
entails all the judgment, humility, and caution he associates with the common 
law method on which, in his view, we rely for the living Constitution.  
The first hundred pages of this book are a tour de force.  Strauss initially 
identifies the challenges the Constitution poses for the evolving American 
society.  He next demolishes the appeal of originalism as a plausible account of 
our national experience – originalism, at least, in any of its familiar forms.  He 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Boston University. 
1 See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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then introduces common law methodology as a theoretical explanation that 
better fits the facts.  His treatment is sophisticated, yet free of legal jargon (and 
distracting citations) that can discourage even serious readers.  To make his 
case even more accessible to a general audience, Strauss illustrates the 
common law method at work in two celebrated contexts – the Supreme Court’s 
incremental development of now-settled principles touching free speech and 
racial equality.  This is a masterful academic achievement.  I would not have 
dreamed that so much crucial ground could be covered so economically 
without sacrificing accuracy.  
II 
Persuaded as I am by Professor Strauss’ primary argument that we have a 
living, common law Constitution, I have some (modest) concerns about his 
additional arguments in chapter 5.  There, he contends that the historical, 
documentary Constitution is “as important as the living Constitution of 
precedents and traditions.”2   
I must say I’m not sure how this can be so, given that common law 
methodology does the heavy lifting.  Strauss plainly doesn’t credit any notion 
that the written Constitution is entitled to respect because of its origins.  With 
Jefferson, he dismisses any claim that we are bound to follow decisions made 
by somebody else a long time ago – because they were smarter than we are or 
because they asserted an authority to rule us centuries later.  Certainly, Strauss 
rejects the idea that the document enjoys democratic bona fides.  Even if the 
1789 document was adopted democratically (it wasn’t, of course, but even if it 
was), we would not be obliged to give it priority over a statute our own 
generation sees fit to enact.  Originalists can contend that the historical 
document is a higher law for these reasons.  But Strauss can’t – and doesn’t.  
In the event, Strauss says this: “[O]ur adherence to the written Constitution 
does not have to depend on veneration of our ancestors or on any 
acknowledgment of their right to rule us from the grave.  The written 
Constitution is valuable because it provides a common ground among the 
American people.”3  This common ground consists of at least some, and 
perhaps numerous, specific decisions that the document makes well enough to 
command consensus support – well enough to leave alone.  There are two 
ideas here.  One is that the document on display at the National Archives is the 
Constitution, providing the text to which we must subscribe.  The other is that 
the written Constitution has genuine value for us today.   
It may be that this document summons enough general agreement about 
enough specific questions to form the common ground of which Strauss 
speaks.  I will come to that in a minute.  But our current (implicit) endorsement 
of choices the document makes with particularity doesn’t necessarily entail 
acceptance of the document as a whole as the Constitution.  After all, we also 
 
2 Id. at 101. 
3 Id.  
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agree on specific provisions in other writings.  I dare say the Massachusetts 
Traffic Code declares somewhere that when an operator is traveling on a two-
way street, he or she should ordinarily bear to the right; that when two vehicles 
meet at an unmarked crossroads, the one to the right gets to pull away first; and 
that the speed limit along unmarked stretches of the Southeast Expressway in 
Boston is 55 mph.  None of these decisions is objectively correct, but we 
accept them because they reasonably settle points that otherwise would require 
endless, wasteful debate.  Well, maybe not the speed limit.  The point is that if 
agreement on tolerable particulars is what makes a document the Constitution, 
the one under glass isn’t the only candidate. 
We, or most of us, do embrace the amended 1789 document as the 
Constitution.  Strauss says that “[a]llegiance to the [written] Constitution, and a 
certain kind of respect for the founding and for crucial episodes in our history, 
seem, to many people, central to what it is to be an American.”4  He doesn’t 
mean that we should be patient with strong views honestly held, even if those 
views rest on a fundamental misconception.  In this passage, as I understand it, 
he means that the public accepts this document as the Constitution, and no 
further grounds for legitimacy need be considered.  Other theorists take 
essentially the same view.5  Maybe Henry Monaghan put it best: the authority 
of this document is “our master rule of recognition.”6  We agree that this is the 
document; let’s move on.   
I am content with this answer.  Questioning what everybody takes to be the 
starting place risks trivializing the serious conversation we are trying to have.  
So I agree, you will be reassured to hear, that the Mass Traffic Code is not the 
United States Constitution.  I hasten to say, though, that I would be more 
comfortable embracing the 1789 document as our foundation if it were, shall 
we say, more foundational.   
Turn to the second idea in Strauss’ explanation for why we adhere to the 
written Constitution – namely its value as the source of a common ground that 
holds us together.  According to Strauss, this common ground is pointedly not 
to be found in the capacious textual formulations that are typically linked to 
our most heralded aspirations – due process of law, equal protection of the 
laws, freedom of expression, and like assurances of individual liberty and 
dignity.7  Those aspects of the written Constitution have consensus support 
only at a level of generality that drains them of any real decision-making 
significance.  They are the protean matters from which the living Constitution 
develops.8  Nor is common ground located in the document’s structural 
 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional 
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1772 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 547 (1999). 
6 Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 384 (1981). 
7 See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 104.  
8 See id. at 52-76. 
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allocations of governmental power – the separate federal executive, the 
bicameral federal legislature, the independent judiciary, and individual states 
with some measure of autonomy.  And it is not in the provisions that envision 
elections and thus some manner of democratic self-government.  Those, too, 
are elements of the written Constitution on which the living Constitution 
builds.   
The common ground Strauss has in mind lies in far less salient provisions 
specifying definite answers to comparatively unimportant questions.  This 
must be so, he explains, because the very point of the argument is that we 
agree on these answers, or at least we are willing to accept them, and we can 
agree only on relatively minor matters where the stakes are low and any 
plausible settlement is good enough for government work.9  In earlier 
scholarship on which this book is based, Strauss explains this idea as an 
instance of conventionalism – “the notion that it is more important that some 
things be settled than that they be settled right.”10  He offers numerical 
illustrations: the provisions in Articles I and II prescribing age requirements 
and fixed terms for federal officers. 
Strauss doesn’t contend that these and other definite settlements in the text 
must form our common ground because their specificity makes it necessary to 
adopt a formal amendment to make a change.  Originally, for example, the 
default date for Congress’ initial meeting was the first Monday in December.  
We changed it by amendment to January 3.11  The need for that amendment 
only proves that good-enough answers win consensus support only when, and 
as long as, there are no strong reasons for adopting an alternative.12 
It’s fair to ask whether a consensus on unimportant constitutional choices is 
sufficient to establish a genuine common ground that unites us in a single 
enterprise, which then proceeds on its own shaped by common law 
methodology.  We can easily beef up the list.  There are certainly other places 
where the fact of a settlement is convenient but its content is not.  We need a 
way to break ties in the Senate, and authorizing the Vice President to do so is 
probably as good an answer as any.13  We need a presiding officer when an 
impeached President goes on trial, and drafting the Chief Justice for that 
service seems unobjectionable.14  But when we tote up these and other 
illustrations, I wonder whether the whole is any more than the sum of its parts.   
To put the point another way, I wonder whether the good-enough answers 
the written Constitution supplies conform to any pattern, far less a pattern 
 
9 See id. at 110-11. 
10 David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 
YALE L.J. 1717, 1733 (2003). 
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2. 
12 Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 113 (explaining the need for making this shift regarding 
a specific point on which the original document had spoken). 
13 See U.S. CONST. art.1, § 3, cl. 4. 
14 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6. 
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demonstrating the common ground we’re looking for.  Notice that in many 
respects the document forgoes definite settlements we might have expected it 
to provide.  The arrangements for the election of senators and representatives 
are left to the discretion of state legislatures or Congress.15  And Congress 
alone has discretion to fix the time for choosing the electors who will select the 
President.16  Notice, too, that the written Constitution provides some fairly 
definite settlements that almost certainly don’t enjoy widespread support 
today.  The electoral college is the usual illustration.  But over the last year lots 
of us have begun to question the wisdom of requiring the Congress to assemble 
every year and barring either the House or the Senate from adjourning for long 
without the consent of the other.  I needn’t say what the public would think 
about a provision requiring us to pay members of Congress for their services 
(if there were any such provision). 
Strauss insists that the value we get from the written Constitution derives 
from its text.  He doesn’t kiss the book and pass on.  He assigns words real 
work to do.  Sometimes, he explains, the written Constitution “decides” issues 
without benefit of common law analysis.17  More fundamentally, the language 
in the document plays a role in every instance.  “[O]ne of the absolute fixed 
points of our legal culture is that we cannot . . . say that the text of the 
Constitution doesn’t matter.”18  “We cannot make an argument for any 
constitutional principle without purporting to show, at some point, that the 
principle is consistent with the text of the Constitution.”19 
Strauss explains that the “common law approach” entails giving the words 
in the written document their “ordinary, current meaning.”20  If I understand 
him correctly, this goes for all the words – both words used in particularistic 
provisions that make up our common ground and words used in more general 
provisions from which common law analysis proceeds.  He explains that 
current meaning trumps historical meaning because, after all, “[t]he idea is to 
find common ground on which people can agree today.”21  That suggests 
provisions that settle minor points well enough to gather consensus support.  
Yet Strauss goes immediately on to a discussion of a protean provision (the 
Sixth Amendment) and demonstrates that assigning current meaning allows 
common law methodology to reach results consistent with modern 
predilections. 
With respect to the definite settlements that make up common ground, 
giving the words of the text their “ordinary, current meaning” is not so easy.  
Bracket the postmodern insight that words have no significance at all apart 
 
15 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1. 
16 See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 4. 
17 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 101. 
18 Id. at 103. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 106. 
21 Id. 
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from what the reader, any reader, chooses to attach to them.  As I understand 
him, Strauss takes the conventional position that words can convey meaning, 
and he would acknowledge (I think) that the meaning words convey depends 
on the context in which they are used.  His argument is that, under the common 
law approach, the proper context is the one that current understandings provide 
– not the historical context that originalists insist upon.22  With respect to 
definite settlements, accordingly, the idea must be (I think) that we have 
widespread consensus about the meaning of the words in which those 
settlements are stated, as we now understand the context in which they appear.  
The form this agreement about context takes is the purpose we think words 
have in the place we find them.   
Take one of Strauss’ concrete examples of a textual provision that makes a 
particular decision well enough to draw general modern support and thus to 
form part of the common ground on which so much turns: the provision in 
Article II specifying the 35-year age requirement for becoming President.23  
Strauss doesn’t say what purpose he thinks we currently assign to this.  But he 
must think we do agree on its purpose, else we can’t subscribe to the choice of 
35 years as an acceptable rule.  Trouble is, there is more than one plausible 
purpose to choose.   
One is that an age requirement ensures that anybody who gets to be 
President is mature enough to do the job.  A 35-year rule serves that purpose 
well enough.  There are others.  Akhil Amar contends that the original purpose 
was to keep the sons of well-known fathers from trading on their family names 
to obtain office despite their lack of merit.24  The 35-year rule served that 
purpose pretty well, too, by postponing “famous son” campaigns until other, 
more capable candidates could prove their worth.  Moreover, the age 
requirement worked in tandem with the four-year term for elected Presidents – 
preventing a sitting President from hanging on until his son could be anointed 
his successor.  English kings sometimes managed that trick.  But in this 
country, so the argument goes, nobody could stay in office long enough to hold 
the place for a son who could not run until after he was 35 years old.25   
Multiple purposes pose a quandary for Strauss.  To make the 35-year age 
requirement serve as an element of our common ground, he has to explain it as 
resolving a matter in our minds now and resolving it well enough to win 
acceptance despite disagreements that (we agree) aren’t worth the candle to 
sort out.  To do that, he must explain what that matter is, this is to say what 
question requires resolution but admits of an imperfect answer.  If we don’t 
know what problem an age requirement for the presidency addresses, we can’t 
know that the 35-year rule supplies a good-enough settlement – which, in turn, 
joins with other definite settlements of other minor issues to create a common 
 
22 But see infra text accompanying note 26. 
23 See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 8. 
24 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 160 (2005). 
25 Id. at 163. 
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ground, which, in turn, opens the way for us to make what we will out of the 
rest of the Constitution.  It may be that, at this point, Strauss allows for some 
attention to original understanding after all.  He says that with respect to 
relatively unimportant questions like this, “[t]he text and the original 
understandings are natural places to look for a solution.”26  But to go that route 
is to abandon his otherwise sweeping rejection of originalism as a means of 
arriving at constitutional meaning. 
I have pushed this last point pretty far.  The principal argument Strauss 
makes about the written Constitution is that it offers points of departure for 
common law development.  He insists only that the results we reach on 
constitutional questions today must be “consistent” with the text – not that our 
results must follow from the text in the hard, interpretive way that originalists 
have in mind.  I can live with this.  The point here is merely that when it comes 
to the minor matters Strauss thinks the document resolves via definite, good-
enough rules, the connection between the results we reach and the language the 
text employs is supposed to be fairly tight, thus to justify adherence to the 
original document because it supplies our common ground. 
III 
I said at the outset that the proper mission of legal theory is explanatory.  In 
that spirit, Professor Strauss devotes his attention to the American 
constitutional scheme as it exists now.  He explains that a living Constitution is 
“an attribute of a mature society, one in which precedents and traditions have 
had an opportunity to develop and evolve.”27  He has nothing to do with the 
way constitutional principles “get established in the first place.”28  It would be 
grossly unfair, then, to complain that Strauss fails to address any changes he 
would recommend in our familiar, occasionally amended, 1789 document. 
It must also be said that Strauss seizes a certain advantage.  He begins in the 
middle of things and describes what he sees from our vantage point today.  I do 
wonder whether what he has to say about the Constitution we have created in 
this country bears on the kind of foundational document we would choose if 
we were to begin again with the purpose of laying the groundwork for common 
law evolution.  Let’s be purely and artificially normative for a moment and 
consider what an original document should look like if it is to promote the 
development of a Constitution that is both alive and well.  I take it we can 
proceed from some overlapping premises.   
We can posit that the existing document has, in fact, fostered a living 
Constitution without proposing that the content of this document is optimal for 
the purpose.  So far as I can see, Strauss makes no such claim.  If we had the 
drafting task to do over again, we wouldn’t necessarily scan the written 
Constitution we have and click on “copy.”  We wouldn’t necessarily start with 
 
26 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 111. 
27 Id. at 117. 
28 Id. 
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this document and edit it into shape.  We might begin again on a clean slate 
and try to fashion provisions even better suited to the living Constitution 
project.   
We can also identify a living Constitution as our goal without abandoning 
all hope for a viable society.  I will be blunt about this.  The governmental 
system that has taken shape in the United States is a monstrous failure.  Under 
its aegis, we have plundered the natural environment, killed or maimed 
countless people in this country and abroad, driven great numbers of others 
into poverty, and treated a favored few (like everyone at this conference) to a 
style of life with comforts checked only by the certain knowledge that things 
cannot go on this way much longer.  Mostly, these miseries flow from our 
selfish culture.  Yet our basic law bears some of the blame.  We have a 
Constitution that celebrates personal avarice, parochialism, and short-term 
interests to the exclusion of any sense of the public good.  Realistically 
speaking, it’s probably too late to save ourselves, or even to save the planet 
from ourselves.  The Constitution is a suicide pact.29  Even so, in this academic 
setting, we may pause to consider whether we might have done better if our 
living Constitution had emerged from a different organic document.  The 
optimistic among us may contemplate whether a better written Constitution 
might yet help us find a way out of the fix we’ve gotten ourselves into. 
We must acknowledge some facts of life.  Any talk of writing a good 
original document is hypothetical to a fault.  The drafting task calls for sober 
judgment about the ideal and brackets all the reasons why sober judgment is 
most unlikely to be exercised.  As the man says, constitutions aren’t written in 
cold blood.  They are written hard upon violent conflicts when factions that 
recently laid down their arms are trying to consolidate their positions.  The 
drafting table is another battlefield, a little less risky to physical health but 
dangerous in all manner of other ways.  Hanna Lerner contends that the 
process doesn’t often identify common ground, but rather sharpens existing 
divisions.30  At best, the focus is on the immediate allocation of power rather 
than on any long-term arrangements that might develop if given the chance.  In 
other writing, Professor Strauss contends that fledgling societies typically 
depend on adherence to constitutional text as a means of ensuring legitimate 
political actions until stable traditions and institutions form to engender trust 
independently.31   
Nevertheless, Albert Blaustein reports that most of the world’s constitutions 
have recently been, or soon will be, revised or drafted anew.32  Even the Brits, 
 
29 But cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(famously warning that the Bill of Rights should not be turned into such a pact). 
30 HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 33 (2011). 
31 David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
924 (1996).    
32 ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN, FRAMING THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: A CHECKLIST, at v 
(1994).   
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whose unwritten Constitution has served for centuries, now seem bent on 
codifying their basic law in one place.33  It may be that this zeal for 
foundational documents reflects a disturbing expectation that a writing can and 
should command the future – the antithesis of what we have in mind.  We 
wouldn’t want a reassessment of the document we have to feed that 
misapprehension.  The point of the exercise, again, is to consider the optimal 
way a document might be written to facilitate the growth of an American living 
Constitution we make up as the future unfolds.   
The risks entailed in any redrafting are numerous and obvious.  In the best 
of circumstances, the prodigal forces that have brought us to our current crisis 
would invade the effort.  Success would almost certainly depend on an open, 
inclusive drafting process, even if the public character of the debates 
accentuates differences and ends up making agreement difficult.  Justus 
Schönlau ascribes any legitimacy the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights may 
enjoy to the open convention used to formulate its provisions.34  Not that 
constitutions can’t survive if they are forged in less appealing circumstances.  
General MacArthur’s lawyers banged out the initial draft of the Japanese 
Constitution inside a week and presented it to the Japanese government 
virtually as a fait accompli.35  Japan survived as a nation, and a pretty good 
one.  But few of us would propose that a constitution concocted in that way 
would foster the development of a genuine living constitution for the people 
concerned.  Then again, it is frightening to say the least even to contemplate 
Sandy Levinson’s idea.  He thinks we should commission another 
constitutional convention with a mandate to examine everything now in place 
and to fix anything that needs fixing.36  
Setting aside the difficulty of choosing the right drafting process, the 
challenge of selecting the content of the document we seek would be ever so 
much more baffling.  One can imagine that the ideal written Constitution 
would describe the system’s architecture.  We might ponder whether we really 
want the national government to be divided even roughly into three functional 
spheres, whether we want to cordon off regions of the country into units, and, 
certainly, whether we want individual units to have any sort of autonomy or, 
instead, to be arms of the national government.  These are controversial 
questions.  Malcolm Feeley and Ed Rubin have shown, for example, that 
 
33 See ANDREW BLICK, CODIFYING – OR NOT CODIFYING – THE UK CONSTITUTION: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2011) (collecting recent publications in point).  Numerous reforms 
adopted in recent years have already advanced the codification movement along, though in a 
fragmented way.  VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 4-5 (2009). 
34 JUSTUS SCHÖNLAU, DRAFTING THE EU CHARTER: RIGHTS, LEGITIMACY AND PROCESS 3-
4, 107-13 (2005). 
35 KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL 
STUDY OF ITS MAKING 16-17 (1991). 
36 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 173 (2006). 
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federalism has little affirmative value to offer and is best understood as an 
historically expedient but flawed means of mitigating internal divisions along 
regional lines.37  We have federalism only because the states wouldn’t accede 
to a more functional form of government.38   
Consider, too, that structural relationships have evolved considerably by dint 
of the living Constitution we want to promote.  The power of the Executive has 
expanded, the Judiciary has moved over to make room for the Administrative 
State, and Congress (alas, Congress) has become essentially dysfunctional.  
The place of the states has also changed dramatically, of course.  Moreover, 
developments at this level are connected.  One reason Congress can’t legislate 
effectively in the national interest is that every state gets two senators, each of 
whom gets one vote – an arrangement that notoriously distributes power and 
wealth to lightly populated states west of the Mississippi.39  Nor are changes in 
these quarters at an end.  Allocations of power are constantly shifting and 
doubtless will move in surprising ways in the future.  As the Executive Branch 
in this country has consolidated its position, many structural changes in the 
United Kingdom have come at the expense of executive authority.40  If we try 
so much as to outline the framework of American government, we risk 
hobbling the emergence of better public mechanisms to deal with an 
unknowable future.  
Many drafting projects around the globe center on identifying and 
describing individual rights.  Schönlau reports that drawing up the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights was thought to be essential to establishing the 
legitimacy of the EU itself.41  One should think that democracy and individual 
rights go hand in hand, the one enabling majoritarian sentiments largely to 
prevail and the other checking the popular impulse to crush nonconformity.  
Still, some sophisticated observers question the wisdom of putting individual 
rights first and foremost.  Levinson, for example, doubts that anything in a 
written Constitution can protect individuals effectively and for long.42  For 
him, it is most important to create political structures that ensure the ability of 
the people to elect their own government and hold it to account.  Then, he 
thinks, we can anticipate that in a serious discussion the majority will be 
 
37 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND 
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 151 (2008). 
38 See John P. Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 799, 816 (1961). 
39 See LEVINSON, supra note 36, at 59-60. 
40 BOGDANOR, supra note 33, at 289. 
41 SCHÖNLAU, supra note 34, at 3. 
42 Sanford Levinson, Do Constitutions Have a Point? Reflections on “Parchment 
Barriers” and Preambles, in WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS DO? 150, 153 (Ellen Frankel 
Paul et al. eds., 2011). 
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persuaded to recognize and retain any individual rights that are truly 
essential.43   
Our current written Constitution offers a poor model regarding individual 
rights.  It’s hard to think that, starting over again, we would pick the peculiar 
list in the Bill of Rights, which was so plainly tied to recent experience.  
Today, a good case could be made for articulating “positive” rights of a rather 
more immediate import – like rights to food, shelter, and medical care.44  
Recall, too, that the living Constitution we have respects individual rights with 
only the most tenuous links to the document in the Archives.  To improve on 
that record, we may want to avoid specifying rights in any particulars, the 
better to leave their development to courts employing common law 
methodology.  Strauss, for his part, contends that the text always matters as a 
touchstone.  It wouldn’t do if the written Constitution’s provisions were 
entirely open-ended.45  By his account, we need enough text to supply an initial 
reference point, even if it doesn’t (and shouldn’t) channel the thinking of 
courts actually fashioning the living Constitution by common law means.  One 
of his examples is Gideon v. Wainwright, where the Supreme Court had the 
benefit of a textual wrinkle that almost certainly appears in the Sixth 
Amendment only by coincidence.46  
Of course, no one would propose that, writing on a clean slate, we should 
spell out individual rights arbitrarily merely to supply the living Constitution 
with words to chew into something worthwhile.  This last point only flags 
another dilemma.  If we began again in an effort to nurture a living 
Constitution, we would soon realize that suitable language to describe 
individual rights is hard to come by.   
All these starting-over problems are daunting to say the least.  So maybe it’s 
just as well that theorists’ primary task is to explain things as they stand in our 
own time, leaving for another day the problems we would face at the dawn of a 
new constitutional order. 
 
* * * * * * 
David Strauss’ book is a jewel.  It is intelligent, stimulating, exciting, and 
sensible at one and the same time.  Into the bargain, the book is manageable to 
the ordinary but serious reader who genuinely wants to know something about 
the Constitution we really have – that is, the Constitution we have made for 
ourselves. 
 
43 LEVINSON, supra note 36, at 175. 
44 See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, Economic and Social Rights, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
551, 553 (1993). 
45 STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 111. 
46 Id. at 107. 
